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Review and Report of the
North point Training Center Riot: August 21, 2009

Review Team:

Larry D. Chandler, Chairman 

Tom D. Campbell

Tommie Lipscomb

Wesley Duke

On October 1, 2009 Deputy Commissioner Al C. Parke and Director of Operations James Erwin assigned and briefed a four person team to review the riot at Northpoint Training Center. The team members decided upon Larry D. Chandler as the chairman.

The review team's assignment and charge was to examine the events leading up to the riot at NTC on August 21, 2009, examine the riot and it's resolution as well as the deactivation of the riot and finally, make recommendations based upon our review and submit a report of our findings. All review team members have reviewed this report and agree to the content. The review team was not involved in the criminal investigations which were being conducted jointly with the Kentucky State Police.

The team's primary duties were designated as follow:

Larry D. Chandler:	Interview staff and agencies directly involved in the riot and review the Critical Incident Management (CIM) of the riot.
Tom Campbell:	Interview staff to assess their views of contributing and aggravating factors.
Tommie Lipscomb:	Interview inmates to assess their views of contributing and aggravating factors.
Wesley Duke.:	Review administrative issues and statistical information.

***Team Qualifications*:**

The team represented over ninety years experience in Corrections. Each team member's resume is on file in the Deputy Commissioner's office.

In addition to their primary responsibilities, each team member was challenged to make suggestions and recommendations in areas of security, programming, classification, Emergency Preparedness, etc...

The team arrived at NTC on Monday, October 5 at 8:00 AM, met with and was briefed by Warden Steve Haney. The team also met with the executive staff as well as representatives from all departments to explain their purpose and goals. Warden Haney advised all staff to cooperate with the team. Review team members and NTC executive staff also toured the facility.

Method of review:

The team was assigned a conference room in which to review reports and interview NTC staff and outside agency staff. All inmate interviews took place inside the NTC secure compound or the institution where they had been transferred. The Review Team took notes of each staff interview. Each inmate interview was recorded.

Preface:

We cannot begin this report without acknowledging the heroic efforts of the entire NTC staff, but in particular the men and women who were working the 3-11 shift that fateful day on August 21, 2009. In addition, the efforts of the CERT team members who entered the yard that evening were beyond extraordinary. Together these men and women neutralized over 1200 angry inmates without loss of life or serious injury. The Department of Corrections and the Commonwealth of Kentucky owes these men and women a huge debt of gratitude for not only doing their daily jobs in a professional manner, but when their mettle was tested, their performance was not found wanting.

Another Herculean task accomplished by the Kentucky Department of Corrections was the transfer of over 700

inmates to other facilities in the state of Kentucky in a matter of hours. This amazing feat was a result of team work, hard work and coordination by a diverse group of Correctional professionals.

The contract employees at NTC also performed above and beyond their contract obligations. Both Aramark and Correct Care staff were on the yard at the onset of the hostilities. Aramark staff assisted in coordinating the monumental task of providing food for the staff and inmates in spite of the loss of their kitchen. Correct Care medical staff coordinated treatment of staff and inmates with the Boyle County EMS while the institution was burning around them.

Finally, the community response was phenomenal, support from both public and private organizations assisted the NTC staff in resolving the riot.

Brief History of NTC:

The Northpoint Training Center opened as an adult, medium security institution for the Department of Corrections in 1983. The site was originally constructed in 1940 as a mental health facility. In 1941 the United States Army operated it for military personnel and for German P.O.W.s. It was then returned to the state and operated as the Kentucky State Hospital. In 1977 it was converted to a youth facility and operated as the Danville Youth Development Center until 1983. At that time it was converted to a medium security prison for the Department of Corrections.

Before the riot NTC had an institutional capacity of 1256 close/medium security inmates with an Operational Capacity of 1226 inmates.

Summary of events from Tuesday, August 18 through Friday, August 21, 2009.

On Tuesday, August 18th at approximately 2:30 PM there was an inmate altèrcation. The circumstances surrounding this altercation were as follows: A black inmate and a white inmate were involved in stealing canteen items from a young Hispanic inmate who had not been at Northpoint Training Center (NTC) long. Other Hispanics became involved and told the two thieves to make good on the items stolen and gave a deadline. Institutional staff was investigating and in fact had offered the black perpetrator protective custody which he refused. When the deadline came, several inmates assembled in the chapel

area and the altercation ensued. Staff responded immediately and the principle parties were placed in the Special Management Unit (SMU). Internal Affairs took over the investigation and over the next day, several other inmates were placed in SMU on administrative investigation status. The facility, as it had always done in the past, was locked down to assure safety and to give staff an opportunity to complete their investigation. Most staff thought the incident was resolved by Thursday morning.

Inmates interviewed expressed that in their minds, the altercation was no big deal and that the thieves got what they deserved and they also stated racial tension played no part in the altercation.

On Wednesday, August 19th, the CERT team was activated to complete a thorough search of the institution. The CERT teams were placed on twelve (12) hour shifts to search the institution. They worked three shifts (until Thursday, August 20th) with only a few contraband items found and only one makeshift weapon. CERT stood down Thursday afternoon.

A meeting took place Wednesday, August 19th between the warden, deputy wardens and the Director of Operations. Among other things, the length of the lock-down was discussed as was controlled movement. Apparently controlled movement had been discussed in the past. The Director of Operations advised the NTC staff to develop a schedule for converting the facility from an open yard to a controlled movement yard. There was also discussion about the possibility of continuing the lock-down until controlled movement could be implemented. This was strongly objected to by the warden and his security deputy.

A committee had been appointed on Wednesday to develop the controlled movement schedule. The schedule they developed was confusing to staff and inmates. It appears to have been the single biggest factor in the inmate uprising. Even though the warden and his staff briefed inmates in each wing, when they left the wings, the inmates were left with a schedule that was confusing and conflicting. Inmates viewed the controlled movement schedule as a permanent punishment for all, resulting in a loss of precious yard time, when only a few inmates were involved in the Tuesday incident.

On Wednesday, October 19th staff had also been instructed by the Director of Operations to change the procedure in the inmate dining room. Inmates were directed to sit on alternating sides as they entered the dining room. This was in contrast to sitting where they were accustomed. The reason for this directive was to avoid self-segregation in the dining room.

(It should be noted that on October 8, 2007, there had been a sit down at NTC involving approximately 60-70 inmates protesting Aramark food and canteen prices. The crowd quickly grew to 300 before they were peaceably dispersed.)

A meeting was held on Friday, August 21, 2009 with the warden, his deputies, the Deputy Commissioner of Adult Institutions and the Director of Operations. This group toured the NTC yard to gauge the tension of the inmates who had been locked-down in the open wing dormitories since Tuesday afternoon. The consensus of this group was that the yard was calm. It was decided to keep the yard locked (with some modifications) down until Monday at which time the controlled movement schedule would be implemented. The warden and the deputy of security protested this decision. Since the yard had appeared calm during the tour, the warden and security deputy proposed releasing the yard and implementing the controlled movement schedule gradually. They were overruled and advised to return to the yard to post the schedule and explain it to the inmate population. They also advised their executive staff of the decision to keep the yard on lock-down and that the controlled movement schedule was going to be implemented on Monday, August 24, 2009. However, many staff who would be responsible for implementing the schedule was not notified; i.e., Shift supervisors, Unit Managers, Food Service, Medical, etc. It should also be noted these key staff members were not involved in the schedule planning process

The warden and his team left the yard at approximately 6:00-6:15 PM and returned to his office to debrief. All who toured felt it went well. But by 6:30 PM the first fire was started in Dorm 6 and the warden put his CERT on stand-by. A few minutes later the second and third fires were set in Dorms 1 and another in Dorm 6. The warden activated the CERT and Incident Action Plan with himself as Incident Commander. And as one tower log indicated, "at 7:10 PM, all Hell broke loose".

Although the inmates did not appear to have much of a plan, inmate anger had been on the rise since Wednesday. There did not appear to be any stockpiling of food or increase in weapons, but there were other signs most notably several inmates dumped their food from their trays on the floor during the morning and noon meals the day of the riot. Aramark staff e-mailed this information to the Deputy Warden/programs, however, it appears this information did not get passed on to the Warden, nor was it acted upon. (Please refer to attachment.)

Summary of staff interviews: 71

The majority of the staff interviewed felt the contributing factors were primarily;

1. **Extended lock-down**
2. **Controlled movement schedule**
3. **Food**
4. **Canteen prices**

Most staff thought racial tension was not a contributing factor.

Summary of inmate interviews: 120 interviews.

The majority of the inmates interviewed felt the contributing factors were primarily;

1. **Extended lock-down**
2. **Controlled movement schedule**
3. **Food**
4. **Canteen prices**

Most inmates interviewed did not think race was an issue.

Summary of outside agency interviews: 7

Most agencies were extremely complimentary of how NTC resolved the riot. All thought the National Incident Management System (NIMS) plan had some shortcomings and most had debriefed within their own departments. NTC had plans to debrief with all agencies, but had not yet done so. It should be noted here that the CorrectCare medical staff and the Boyle County Emergency Medical Service's performance was well above the call of duty in providing medical attention to staff and inmates alike.

Recommendation:

Annual briefings and tours by all critical agencies to review changes in plans, policies and personnel.

The most vocal about the shortcoming of the handling of the incident was the Boyle County Fire Chief who had some very negative comments about the lack of NIMS protocols and the lack of water pressure to fight fires.

A brief explanation of the water pressure problem was provided by the maintenance supervisor. A ten inch main water line in the dining room had failed.

When this was accomplished the water pressure returned to normal allowing the fire companies to fight the numerous fires on the yard.

Recommendation:

Put water cut-off valves outside the secure perimeter to allow staff to shut off water to specific zones of the institution safely.

Due to a statewide CERT Basic Academy, we did not interview the CERT commanders of the institutions who supported NTC during the riot but we did request their briefing reports.

Summary of Critical Incident Management of the NTC riot:

The warden stated at the outset of this review that he probably could have done better at implementing the Incident Action Plan. We agree there were many opportunities for improvement in resolving the incident. Notwithstanding, the review team feels it is important to point out that the outcome could not have been any better. Although there was extensive property loss, there was no loss of life, no serious injuries and no escapes.

However, during the active stages of the incident and in the deactivation stage of the incident, documentation was not completed. Documentation is an essential part of the Critical Incident Plan and was grossly overlooked.

To identify the problems with the Critical Incident Management, we interviewed several outside agencies, several institutional staff, CERT members and reviewed available documentation. (One glaring problem was the lack of or incomplete documentation written at the time of the incident).

***Command Center*:**

Although the Command Center was established early according to the Institutional Action Plan (IAP), it was not used to its fullest capacity as outlined in the IAP.

Central Office staff opened the Command Center in Frankfort and coordinated assistance and resources from that location. This proved invaluable as the night unfolded.

Recommendation:

Modernize the command center to be on par with the Central Office Command Center.

Notification System:

Recommendation:

An automated call system for all staff with the capability to activate for priority staff only.

Staging:

This plan was virtually ignored and as a consequence caused some congestion at critical locations for emergency services and law enforcement personnel.

Recommendation:

Annual training and briefings with all agencies involved.

Liaisons:

There was an officer assigned to the county fire chief but the officer was constantly pulled from this duty. Most other services were left to their own devices to find information until the warden established the hourly briefing schedule. The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and the Advanced Registered Nurse Practioner (ARNP) had worked together and by chance rather than design, implemented a medical plan.

Recommendation:

Fully implement all aspects of the Institutional Action Plan (IAP) and utilization of the Command Center to assure a Unified Command Structure.

Command Structure:

The Command Structure did not follow the Critical Incident manual. There was also a break-down in the Unified Command System between the NTC Command staff and the outside agencies.

Another problem that proved problematic was the NTC Operations Center is in an unsecured area on the yard.

Recommendation:

Fully implement the IAP.

Move the Operations Center to a more secure location. Perhaps this can be incorporated during the new construction.

Communications:

There were problems throughout the evening of the riot with radio and other communications between NTC and outside agencies, among NTC staff and among the CERT operations. Although generally the radios at NTC were in good shape, there were isolated problems.
CERT also had problems with communications among the team members when they were dispersed to the yard.
Radio communications between all agencies involved was virtually non-existent causing chaos and a general feeling of disconnect with the various agencies involved.

Recommendation:

Establish a repair preventive maintenance plan for the institutional radios to assure each is functioning properly.
Access the Mutual Aide Frequencies from the Kentucky State Police to assure communication among the various agencies assisting NTC or other institutions involved in a similar incident.

Deactivation:

Staff was not required to submit a written report at the end of their involvement as required by CPP 8.7. There was an inmate count and an accounting for staff, but no formal accounting for equipment, chemical weapons and ammunition.

Recommendation:

Assure assigning a staff member to coordinate the accounting of all staff before they leave the institution. Assign a staff member to assure all weapons, ammunition and critical equipment are accounted for and safely returned.

Reporting:

There was a gross lack of coordination of submitting reports by all concerned. This incident contained use of force on all levels, medical emergencies, outside agencies, press releases, criminal investigation, disciplinary investigation and possible civil litigation, etc. which will require accurate and timely reporting.

Recommendation:

Assure all staff submits written record of their involvement and observations before departing the institution. Also assure a seasoned staff member reviews all written reports ASAP. The longer this critical function is delayed, the more likely those individual observations will be diluted by group think.

Investigations:

The Kentucky State Police (KSP) attempted to begin the criminal investigation immediately after order was restored but were advised by the Director of Operations that the investigation would be conducted internally. Several days later, two staff members from the Justice Cabinet arrived at NTC to begin the investigation but determined the KSP would be the appropriate agency to conduct the criminal investigations. As a

result, a considerable delay in the formal investigation occurred.

It is our opinion that the criminal investigations should have started immediately to preserve evidence, testimony and critical information. This would also have assured that each inmate involved in the incident would be prosecuted and receive administrative disciplinary actions to the fullest extent of the law.

After a few days, staff thoughts and observations became diluted and tended to be 'group think' rather than individual thoughts and observations.

Evidence was further compromised because most video cameras failed the evening of the riot.

Recommendation:

Criminal and internal investigations should be authorized to begin immediately after an incident. The longer this critical function is delayed, the more likely critical information and evidence will be diluted or lost.

Insure the institution has adequate video/still cameras and trained staff with a system is in place to assure they are fully charged and equipped to be ready for duty at any time.

Summary of aggravating issues:

Systemic:

The NTC inmate population had an inordinate number of Close and near Close custody felons in a facility with an open wing configuration and very minimal activities related to addressing their criminal activity.

Recommendations:

Review the distribution of Close and near Close custody inmates to equitably distribute this classification of inmates between state institutions.

Programming:

NTC had a lack of programs that could engage large numbers in inmates in positive activities. Other institutions have Therapeutic Community Substance Abuse Programs, Sex Offender Treatment Programs, and large academic programs ranging from Adult Basic Education to College degree programming.

Recommendations:

Examine the establishment of large scale programming at NTC. This committee would recommend establishing another Substance Abuse Program at NTC, expanding the educational programs (perhaps establishing a therapeutic community for education) or perhaps establishing NTC as the KY DOC's prerelease institution.

Facility:

The physical plant is not conducive to housing the level of custody inmates. Open wings with ten, six, four and two man alcoves off the wings is a security dilemma to monitor and provide the level of security required by the type of inmates housed at NTC.

A brief historical review of the critical incidents since the opening of NTC in 1983 should be a painful reminder of the shortcomings of the physical plant.

Several critical entry/exit doors failed during the riot. Most were breached by inmates merely kicking the doors open. This is of course, unacceptable.

Once inmates had gained access to the yard, there was very little to stop them from moving as a crowd into areas considered sensitive.

Recommendations:

All critical security hardware should be examined and replaced with modern security hardware.

Review the layout of the yard to place interior fencing to control access to sensitive areas.

Consider the addition of a non-lethal electric fence to the perimeter to enhance security.

Staffing:

Recommendations:

Prior to the riot, the ratio of inmates to Classification/Treatment Officers in the general population was approximately 200-1.

The Classification/Treatment staff should be increased to lower the case load of each officer to approximately 100 inmates per CTO. This would enable timely classification, transfers and custody reviews.

We strongly recommend that each living area be assigned an officer on each floor as well as a dedicated roving officer and a dedicated supervisor for each unit and each shift.

Controlled Movement:

Recommendation:

The KY DOC has a history of success in implementing major changes affecting staff and inmates. All of the major changes on the past decade were carefully planned and carried out methodically. In every case the method of implementation had been to inform and educate the staff as well as the inmate population to the why, how and when of the impending change. Examples of successful changes within the KY DOC are: conversion of inmate personal clothing to khaki uniforms,

implementation of a more restrictive visitation policy and converting several prisons to tobacco free facilities without major incidents.

Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex has utilized a controlled movement scheme since its opening and has revised and improved the plan over time.

The decision to announce this significant schedule change on a Friday evening with minimal staff at work and an inmate population that was already upset about the lockdown was questionable.

The implementation of the controlled movement policy at NTC was haphazard and poorly planned at best. The schedule itself, a product of only a day and a half study was confusing and inadequate. Also the inmates and staff, most notably the security staff was not informed nor did they have input into the planned change.

Correctional Emergency Response Team **(*CERT*)*:***

The fifteen CERT that entered the yard the evening of August 21 performed admirably although there were problems. Most of the issues have been addressed above, but will be enumerated here to assure review.

Recommendation:

Food Service and Aramark:

Virtually every staff member interviewed who was assigned in the main compound and every inmate interviewed attribute Aramark food and Aramark canteen prices as one reason for the riot. Apparently there had been complaints for years about the quality of the food, the portion sizes and the continual shortage and substitutions for scheduled menu items. Sanitation of the kitchen was also a source of complaints. A review of the records revealed that the number of grievances involving Aramark was not excessive. But the inmates felt that because Aramark had the food service and the canteen accounts, there was a monopoly and possibly a conspiracy.

Inmates also felt their complaints and grievances about the food and canteen were falling on deaf ears.

However, a review of the last price comparisons conducted by the KY DOC did not indicate any unusually high pricing across the board. NTC had only one item on the product comparison that was higher than any other institution. The Aramark canteen manager indicated she did a local 'market basket' price comparison with the local convenient stores in the area and Aramark prices were comparable (her records were lost in the fire).

It should also be noted the NTC also supplemented the Aramark menu with special portions at least once per month.

Recommendations:

One problem that plagues Aramark is the inconsistency of good quality managers for any extended period. That seems to have been the case at NTC. The previous Aramark manger had built a good operation and had the respect of the staff and inmate population. A new manager was sent to replace the previous manager and had to start all over again.

Keeping good mangers in the institutions and providing support for them would, in the review team's opinion, go a long way in resolving some of the critical issues and providing consistency. It should be noted that all the Aramark staff interviewed were aware of the inmate complaints.

Review Team Conclusions-Cause of Riot:

The review team, after extensive interviews with staff and inmates agree that the primary cause of the riot was the posting of a 'controlled movement' schedule after an extended lock-down (Tuesday, August 18th until Friday, August 21st). Inmates felt they were being punished for something a handful of other inmates had been involved with and that the NTC staff had placed those culprits in segregation. This was out of character with the way NTC had handled previous altercations. Normally, NTC locked down after a major incident, investigated, placed the perpetrators in segregation, gauged the mood of the yard and if the staff felt the yard was stable, NTC returned to normal operations.

The inmates were then informed on Friday, August 21st that they would remain on a modified lock-down through the week-end and would be subject a permanent controlled movement schedule effective Monday August 24th, 2009.

The decision to remain on lock-down and implement the controlled movement schedule was debated by the NTC warden and his staff with the KY DOC Deputy Commissioner and the Director of Operations. The NTC staff wanted to return the yard to normal operations and although they essentially agreed with the controlled movement concept, they wanted to implement the controlled movement schedule gradually. Their judgment was over-ridden by the Deputy Commissioner after a brief tour of the yard Friday afternoon, August 21st.

It should be noted there was a miscommunication or a disagreement between the Central Office staff and the NTC staff regarding the incident that precipitated the lock-down on Tuesday, August 18th. The NTC staff thought they had a handle on what had happened and in fact, had the situation under control. The Deputy Commissioner and Director of Operations disagreed. They did not think the NTC had a true picture of what had happened and thought that the NTC staff wanted to release the yard to gain additional information.

One other fact that apparently did not get reported to the Warden or to the Central Office staff was that at the Friday (August 21st) Breakfast meal and the Friday (August 21st) lunch meal, several inmates (approximately 30-40) dumped their food from their trays to the floor.

The controlled movement schedule was thrown together in a day and a half by the Deputy Warden of programs, a Correctional Unit Administrator and the institutional Pre-Release Officer. They had very little time and very limited input from other staff members.

The new schedule was very restrictive compared to what the inmates were accustomed:

<u>Previous Yard Hours</u>

8:00 A.M. – 3:00 P.M. 3:30 P.M. – Dark
During open yard hours, inmates were permitted to participate in recreation activities, library services, canteen, and smoking.

<u>New Controlled Movement Schedule</u>

[Recreation]
One hour each day per dorm on a rotating basis.

[Library]
One day every 6 days from 8:00 A.M. – 10:30 A.M. and/or 12:00 P.M. – 2:30 P.M. and if your day is Thursday, additional time of 5:00 P.M. – 8:30 P.M.
Total 5 hours + Thursday night (3 hours).

[Canteen]
Each dorm-one day for 2 hours per week.

[Food Service]
Twenty minutes for each meal (No change)

[Smoking Schedule]
One (1) ten (10) minute break, five (5) times per day + when out on recreations and to and from programs.

Unfortunately the majority of the security staff and unit management staff were not aware of the schedule's particulars. There is also some disagreement about the quality and how much information was given to the inmate population and the dorm staff when the warden and his staff toured each dormitory to explain and post the schedule. The fact remains, fifteen minutes after the warden and his staff left the yard from posting and explaining the schedule, the first fire was started in Dorm 6 using the new controlled movement schedules as fuel for the fires.

The vast majority of the staff and inmates interviewed did not think race was an issue or cause of the riot. Although there were black inmates, white inmates and Hispanic inmates involved in the Tuesday, August 18th incident, the staff and inmates interviewed thought race was a moot issue. The inmates felt the thieves had gotten yard justice and all culprits involved in the thefts and assaults had been apprehended and placed in segregation.

Although there had been numerous complaints about Aramark, they were not a primary factor for the riot. Aramark had certainly been an irritant and provided numerous frustrations and perceived oppressions. Once the spontaneous destruction started, the Aramark dining room and canteen were targets. However it cannot go without saying, their staff performed admirably after the riot in assisting with the monumental logistical task of providing meals in terrible conditions.

Review Team Conclusions-Handling of Riot:

Although the Institutional Action Plan was not strictly followed during the resolution of the riot the Review Team does not believe the outcome could have been any better. The NTC staff performed heroically and the incident was resolved without loss of life and very few injuries.

The KY DOC has in the NTC riot an incident that will provide excellent training opportunities and examples for improvements for years to come.

Review Team Conclusions-Deactivation:

One major area of concern was the lack of documentation submitted and the conclusion of the incident and the delay of the investigation. Although not necessarily fatal, these failures have impeded the successful and timely conclusion to disciplinary and criminal investigations.

The delay in debriefing has also diluted the problems and solutions that are fresh on everyone's mind immediately after an incident of this magnitude.

Review Team Conclusions-Recommendations:

Our recommendations are sprinkled throughout the report for brevity as well as allow the reader to see the recommendation close in proximity to the issue that raised the need for improvement.

Another observation by the Review Team after interviewing the NTC staff, many are angry. Some are angry at the inmates, some are angry at the Administration and some just angry in general. The Review Team did notice several Kentucky Employee Assistance Program (KEAP) posters on the staff bulletin boards and acknowledges that a team of mental health staff did visit after the riot. We recommend the KY DOC continues to monitor their staff. The warden, KY DOC central office staff were notified of our observations as well as the KY DOC Director of Mental Health. Hopefully a post Critical Incident team can be mobilized again to address the possibility of Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome among staff.

The review team also feels this is an excellent time for the larger mission of Northpoint Training Center to be thoroughly reviewed before millions of dollars are expended for renovation. Central Office and NTC Executive staff should be equally involved in this process.

Institutional Statistics August 21, 2009:

Inmate count: 1227
Inmate classification breakdown:

Community:	**27**
Minimum:	**59**
Restricted:	**5**
Medium:	**911**
Close:	**222**
Maximum:	**3**
Total	**1227**

***Inmates with score 16-18 (within one major disciplinary report from Close custody)-125**

Inmate programs:	**See attachment**
Jobs:	
Education:	
Correctional Industries:	
Other:	
Staffing:	
Total staff:	**280**
Security by shift:	
7-3	**92**
3-11	**60**
11-7	**49**
Total security	**201**
Aramark:	
FSD	**5**
Canteen	**7**
Correct Care	**18 including part-time**
Staff call-ins:	**0 night of incident**
Grievances:	**See attachment**
Staff conflict:	
Food:	
Canteen:	
Medical:	
Disciplinary:	**See attachment**
Fights:	
Assaults:	
Contraband:	